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THE SUPREME COURT AND CELEBRITY CULTURE
RICHARD A. POSNER*
Remarks at the Symposium on the Supreme Court and the Public
November 15, 2012
My assigned topic is public intellectual activity by Supreme Court
justices, but I'm going to expand it in one direction. I'm going to talk
about the Supreme Court justices' behavior at oral argument as well,
because that is a parallel phenomenon, closely related to their public
intellectual activities-it could even be regarded as a part of them. I'm
going to talk about how the justices' public intellectual and questioning
activities have changed over the last half century and I'm going to offer
some reasons for why there has been this change and also try to ex-
plain the process, the dynamic, of such changes.1 I'll also talk a bit
about the consequences.
It happens to be fifty years ago that I clerked on the Supreme
Court and just a few years after that I was an assistant to the Solicitor
General, and so I'm pretty familiar with the way the Supreme Court
operated in the early 1960s-and it is quite different from today. The
justices were very quiet in those early days. They didn't ask many
questions at oral argument and they engaged in few public intellectual
activities. They were quiet-almost cloistered. It was the era of the
Warren Court, and the Court was very activist and controversial, but
the justices weren't really public figures except for Warren, because he
was Chief Justice and because of his authorship of Brown v. Board of
Education. And then there was Justice Douglas, the only colorful figure
on the Supreme Court, who wrote a good deal about subjects unrelated
to law, such as the environment, and had an irregular personal life that
made him an object of some public interest. The rest of the justices
were pretty much wallflowers.
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law
School.
1. For some background data on these activities, see LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RATIONAL CHOICE, 37-40, 305-36 (2012).
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And this historically had been the general character of Supreme
Court justices, except when the court was embattled, and then they
might step forward, a famous example being the Hughes-Brandeis let-
ter to Congress in 1937 obliquely criticizing Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan. That was a dramatic intervention in a political struggle, but such
interventions were rare. And even though the Warren Court was con-
troversial, I don't think the justices felt any sense of embattlement or
any need to make their case to the public.
So how have things changed? Well, now the Supreme Court justic-
es are both very voluble at oral argument-extraordinarily so; the
lawyers can barely get a word in edgewise-and very much involved in
public intellectual activities, whether it's presiding at moot courts or
conducting mock trials of historical or fictional personages or writing
books. These are changes that I am presenting as snapshots taken at a
fifty-year interval. And we don't have good records of the justices' pub-
lic intellectual activities. They do make public reports of their outside
activities, but the reports are not complete or detailed. So it's hard to
pinpoint the occurrence of the changes that I am discussing.
Justice Brennan said early in his Supreme Court career when
asked about his relations with the press that he would not meet with a
journalist in any place, at any time, on any subject. But in the '80s,
when the Reagan administration, particularly in the person of Ed
Meese, was criticizing the Supreme Court as excessively liberal, Bren-
nan changed his view and made a series of television appearances to
present his side of the issue. But my impression is that as the issue of
the Court's liberalism faded with Reagan's appointment of conserva-
tive justices, public activity of that character by justices also faded. It's
exploded in the last few years, however, particularly since Justice
Souter retired; although he was quite voluble in the Supreme Court's
oral arguments, he didn't engage in any public intellectual activities all.
His replacement, Justice Kagan, is active on both the oral argument and
public intellectual fronts. All nine of the current justices engage in pub-
lic intellectual activities and all but Justice Thomas are very talkative
during oral arguments.
Why the increases in these parallel behaviors of Supreme Court
justices-public intellectual writings and appearances, and volubility
at oral argument? I can think of three possible reasons. One, a general
phenomenon relating to public intellectual activity is that there's much
greater access to the media today than in times pasts. There's no more
gatekeeping by newspapers and magazines. You can upload a cat video
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to YouTube and if it catches on ("goes viral") you can become a celebri-
ty in minutes. The media, realistically defined to include the Internet
and not just radio, television, and the print media, are vastly expanded
and therefore have a desperate need for content. Anyone with some
celebrity potential will be courted by the media and so encounter no
difficulty in obtaining public exposure.
Second, the cost of public intellectual activity by Supreme Court
justices has fallen because they have more time on their hands. When I
was a Supreme Court law clerk, in the olden days (the 1962 term), the
Court was deciding about twice as many cases (after oral argument
and with full opinion) than it is today. And staff was much more lim-
ited; each justice had two law clerks instead of the present four. Staff
was also of lower quality on average, because, though this is hard to
believe in this era of the $280,000 dollar signing bonus for Supreme
Court law clerks, not only were there no signing bonuses but a Su-
preme Court clerkship was not that big a deal. There weren't many
applications; there were no particular standards. Often the justice
would delegate the selection of his law clerks to a personal friend, a
professional acquaintance, or a law professor he was friendly with,
without bothering to screen or interview applicants himself. There was
no expectation that Supreme Court law clerks would already have
served a clerkship for a lower-court judge, though that sometimes
happened. Often the justice would not interview his prospective clerks.
Overall, the process was casual. No more, and so the quality of Su-
preme Court staff has increased. And the cert pool (whereby one law
clerk writes a cert memo for eight of the nine justices-all but Alito,
who has opted out of the pool) has freed up a great deal of law clerk
time to spend on the smaller number of opinions that the Court is issu-
ing. They are very eager and aggressive people, these law clerks, so
there is a subtle pressure exerted on Supreme Court justices to dele-
gate more and more work to the clerks. With larger and better staff
and a lighter caseload the justices have more time for travel, public
intellectual activities, writing books, whatever it is they like to do. The
opportunity costs of being a public intellectual Supreme Court justice
thus have fallen.
Access to the media, the opportunity to be a celebrity and have
your name in the papers and on the screen and so on-these are at-
tractive to many people; people like to be lionized. There are also more
extracurricular financial opportunities for Supreme Court justices than
used to be the case-book deals with big advances. With the oppor-
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tunity costs of public intellectual activities diminished and some finan-
cial benefits to boot, it's not surprising that there should have been an
increase in Supreme Court justices' public intellectual activity.
But that doesn't explain why there's so much more volubility at
oral argument. One possibility is since the justices have fewer cases
and ampler and better staff, they should be better prepared at oral
argument; and the better prepared they are, the more confident they
can be about being able to ask questions without embarrassing them-
selves. And since the oral arguments increasingly are publicized in the
media and recordings of the arguments occasionally played in public,
the Supreme Court justices, by the questions they ask or comments
(often flippant) that they make at oral argument, obtain an audience
outside of the legal community. So it's a kind of public intellectual ac-
tivity.
I said I would describe the dynamic of this process. You all know
what an equilibrium is and often the same system has multiple equilib-
ria. So, for example, H20 can be a gas, can be a liquid, can be a solid, and
it's characteristic of multiple equilibria that the change from one to
another can be very abrupt. At 211 degrees Fahrenheit H2 0 is a liquid
and at 212 degrees it is a gas. So a small change can have a dramatic
effect.
I can imagine two equilibria in the Supreme Court with regard
both to volubility at oral argument and to public intellectual activity.
One is forbearance-being quiet on the bench and not engaging in pub-
lic intellectual activity. In short, being a wallflower. If all the justices
are wallflowers, that's fine for them. It's the way the Supreme Court
has been most of the time historically. The other equilibrium is every-
body talking on the bench, everybody engaged in public intellectual
activities. Consider how one of the equilibria might give way to the
other one. Suppose one justice is very voluble and the rest are quiet.
That's all right; he's an outlier, an eccentric. But suppose there's a
change in membership and now two or three who are talking a lot at
oral argument. The others may become uncomfortable. They may say
to themselves: "Oh look, the public is going to think there are these
smart guys who ask questions and the rest of us sitting there like
dumbbells who probably don't understand what's going on and that's
why we don't ask questions and make witty sallies and so on." And
similarly if some of the justices start going out and appearing on talk
shows and they're being written about and writing books and articles
and what have you, the others may feel like wallflowers-no one's in-
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terested in them, they don't have any audience outside the handful in
the Supreme Court courtroom. They become uncomfortable. Thus,
once there is an alteration in the demeanor of a few justices, the
change can spread rapidly throughout the Court. This is what scientists
call a phase transition, a very rapid change from one equilibrium to
another. That may be what's happened in the Supreme Court.
So now, while Justice Thomas doesn't ask questions or otherwise
participate actively in the give and take of oral argument, all the others
are very active talkers. And all nine are involved in public intellectual
activity. It seems a stable equilibrium, though it could change if a
bunch of introverts were appointed, like Justice Souter.
Are the developments I've described good or bad? I think they're
bad, but also inconsequential, especially the volubility at the oral ar-
guments. The quality of discussion is not high. There's a lot of clown-
ing. It's an undignified spectacle. But there's very little dignity in
American public life these days, which is why I say the justices' volubil-
ity is inconsequential.
I have stronger objections to their public intellectual activity.
Again there's a dignity factor though again I attach little weight to it.
The Wall Street Journal had a picture on its front page a couple of years
ago of Justice Ginsburg wearing a Civil War-style uniform because she
was presiding at a posthumous court martial of George Custer for hav-
ing blown the Battle of the Little Big Horn. And just to show that I'm
not just a sourpuss, I have no criticism of Justice Sotomayor's appear-
ance on Sesame Street adjudicating a dispute between two stuffed an-
imals. That sounds ridiculous but she was doing this for children and
there was no pretense that she was engaged in a serious intellectual
activity.
But I strongly disapprove of mock trials of historical and fictitious
characters and of historical controversy.2 Several Supreme Court jus-
tices have presided at trials of whether Shakespeare was the actual
author of the Shakespearean plays or whether it was the Earl of Ox-
ford. This is crank stuff, like belief in flying saucers and a flat Earth.
Moreover, Supreme Court justices have no competence to opine on
such an issue. It's an issue for Renaissance historians and literary
scholars. It's not for judges. When Supreme Court justices venture into
areas about which they know nothing, they create a bad impression of
the judiciary. One justice has presided over trials of Hamlet for mur-
2. See Richard A. Posner, Mock Trials and Real judges, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Aug.
2013).
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dering Polonius; trials in which Hamlet's defense is insanity. But if you
know the play, you know that Hamlet kills Polonius thinking that Polo-
nius is Claudius, whom he wants to kill. There's nothing insane about
Hamlet's action on that occasion; it's a case of mistaken identity, not
insanity. He thinks Claudius killed his father and committed adultery
with his mother. He wants to kill Claudius, as there is no way of bring-
ing Claudius to justice in the usual way, since Claudius is the king.
Whatever mental problems Hamlet displays at other times in the play
are not involved in his accidental killing of Polonius.
A mock-trial favorite is whether Richard III was really responsible
for killing the little princes. There is actually a good deal of historical
controversy over how evil Richard III was and how deformed he was.
Recently in a construction excavation in England, Richard's skeleton
was found and sure enough it was deformed by scoliosis, though may-
be not as badly deformed as depicted by Shakespeare in Richard III
because the controversy over Richard was a phase of Tu-
dor/Plantagenet rivalry, and Elizabeth I was a Tudor and Richard had
been a Plantagenet. So there is a lively historic controversy, but the
justices are in no position to opine on it. It doesn't create a good im-
pression when a person by virtue of being prominent in one field starts
offering irresponsible opinions in another field. That is Donald Trump
syndrome.
But the real objection to the mock trials (forcefully made by Law-
rence Douglas, a professor at Amherst) is that they reflect a misunder-
standing of what a trial is-which is an odd mistake for a judge to
commit. Trials are not designed for or used to determine historical
truth. The reason is that, if you think about it, many aspects of the trial
process subordinate the truth-seeking function of the trial to other
social values, such as privacy. Some highly probative evidence is ex-
cluded merely because it was obtained illegally or because its proba-
tive value is deemed outweighed by the likely prejudicial effect of the
evidence on jurors. Nor are trials designed to determine contested
historical facts from long ago, especially in foreign countries. Justices
who use trials to determine historical truth are perpetuating a miscon-
ception of the nature and capabilities of trials.
But as I said I don't think that these extracurricular activities by
judges are of any consequence. I am mindful of the perennial concern
about threats to the "legitimacy" of the judiciary. It's true that political
stability depends to a degree on popular acceptance of the legitimacy
of the basic political institutions of a society, including its judiciary. But
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acceptance of the institution must not be confused with having a high
regard for its personnel. Think of Congress, which has an approval
rating of less than twenty percent. No one says, "Congress had better
watch out, it has a low approval rating, indicating doubts about its le-
gitimacy, and soon people are going to start proposing that Congress
be abolished." Congress feels no "existential" threat, and there isn't any
and there's no greater threat to the Supreme Court, which anyway has
more than twice the approval rating. It doesn't matter whether people
like the Supreme Court justices, or don't like them, or know who they
are. Actually, the names of very few Supreme Court justices are known
to the public. For many years, the only one who had a recognition per-
centage above five or six percent was Justice O'Connor, because she
was the only woman, so she was a focal point. Even someone very well
known in legal circles, like Justice Scalia, has only about a five percent
recognition rate. Many people if you ask them how decisions are ar-
rived at by courts will give you all sorts of unflattering explanations:
politics, connections, mistakes, what have you. But that doesn't damage
the courts. Their decisions are still obeyed, and they mete out sanc-
tions that are enforced by the executive branch, and they're treated
politely by the legislative branches and by the states, and so on. So I
don't think there's a legitimacy issue with regard to the Supreme Court.
That's why, even if I or others don't think that their public intellectual
activities and their behavior at oral argument bathe the Court in an
attractive light, there are no consequences. They're having a good time,
and they're not hurting the institution, even though one can criticize
them for these activities I've been describing if you're a fusspot like me.
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